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Abstract: How can the West continue to shape international order
without over-committing itself to ruinous and ambiguous operations on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan? This article addresses
this question by examining the failures of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and by outlining three alternatives for future engagements: the Libya model, the indirect approach, and contingency
operations in support of multilateral organizations. Each presents
unique possibilities, but the imperative for strategic clarity and commitment is consistent.

B

y December 2014, the large-scale Western military effort in
Afghanistan will be over, ending more than a decade of direct
intervention in that country and Iraq. A page is being turned
in the history of warfare and, as most recognize, there is a need to take
stock of the diverse but often painful experiences of the past, and to
translate these into appropriate lessons for future interventions.
That the recent campaigns, despite substantial investment, have
yielded such limited results is difficult to accept. Yet denial will not
prepare us for the future. Indeed, if the West is to remain in the business
of shaping global affairs, sometimes by force of arms, it must resolve
the contradictions raised by its recent campaigns.1 Most pressingly, it
seems, the West wants the rights that go along with global leadership,
but not the responsibilities and costs. How can we bridge this gap? How
can the West sustain its contribution to a very particular international
order, without falling into the pitfalls that characterized the last decade?
Creative solutions are urgently needed.
This article examines three such solutions in light of the failures of
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. These alternate approaches provide
more limited applications of force and more modest roles. Recent
history suggests that—within key contexts and preconditions—such
approaches can be successful.

The Challenges in Afghanistan

An important first step to understanding the challenges faced
in Afghanistan is to broaden the scope of analysis beyond the mere
conduct of operations. Many of the mistakes in Afghanistan were strategic and, therefore, had little to do with counterinsurgency. These include
the creation of a highly centralized form of governance, the wasted
opportunities provided by the fall of the Taliban, the massive diversion
caused by the war in Iraq, and the decision to expand the International
Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF’s) area of operations beyond Kabul
without committing a fraction of the resources necessary for security
1     For a cogent list of areas of enquiry, see Francis G. Hoffman, “Learning Large Lessons
from Small Wars,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/
learning-large-lessons-from-small-wars/.
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and stability. Underlying these missteps was the inability of international
allies to establish common political and strategic aims.
The campaign was defined by three separate and poorly coordinated efforts: the US-led counterterrorism effort of Operation Enduring
Freedom-Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
-led ISAF effort to provide security and to enable the third mission,
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a UN
effort devoted to political and economic development. On one side of
the spectrum, Afghanistan was a narrow exercise in counterterrorism;
on the other, it was statebuilding aimed at establishing democracy,
gender equality, and human rights. Rather than a propitious division
of labor, the broad spectrum of aims provided the West with the false
comfort of “doing it all,” all at once, and with little need for prioritization. Tensions between competing interests were glossed over, but
became strikingly apparent with NATO’s expansion beyond Kabul and
the steady deterioration of security thereafter. The bloodshed deepened
strategic divisions, both between and within individual governments.
In a context where victory was not really a relevant concept, the
lack of political and strategic direction had serious consequences. Most
importantly, it thwarted the essential process of balancing ends, ways,
and means, and the mismatches therein which became increasingly
obvious. Security worsened and the United States, having “discovered counterinsurgency” in Iraq, was called upon to rescue the effort.
Counterinsurgency was seen as the solution to a strategic problem.2
However, as an operational approach, it could not possibly provide
the answer. The fact that the launch of the “Surge” and the switch to
population-centric counterinsurgency coincided with the first talk of
withdrawal from Afghanistan clearly did not help.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Theories and concepts should be used to make sense of a complex
reality and to support the dynamic process of analysis, decisionmaking,
and implementation. This is not just an intellectual exercise; the concepts we use have an impact on how we interpret the conflict, prioritize
our resources, and conduct operations. Selecting a concept, or a term
(like counterinsurgency), requires great care: ideally, it should help us
understand the true nature of the problem, and how best to deal with it.
How does counterinsurgency measure up? The concept has been
useful in moving many armed forces from an exclusive focus on conventional warfare, yet in itself, the idea of counterinsurgency has served
better as an antithesis to past pathologies than as a prescriptive guide for
ongoing campaigns. In Afghanistan, for several reasons, the introduction of a counterinsurgency framework did not help us understand the
true nature of the problem or how to reach our aims.
The first reason stems from the misinterpretation and overgeneralization of lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns. Historians
and military thinkers often stress the limited generalizability of operational approaches from one context to the next. One would, therefore,
assume that when a colonial policing approach was revived to support
2     Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,”
Survival 52, no. 5 (2010): 168.
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the state-building campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, care would be
taken to appreciate the differences separating these two worlds. Yet such
analysis was all too rare.
One result of this rather problematic reading of history was the exaggeration of the “hearts and minds” aspect of operations, and the neglect
of often equally important coercive components.3 Much of the emerging
wisdom was based on polished historical accounts of past campaigns
that were never critically examined. Instead, a liberal 21st century filter
was applied that simply reinforced preexisting biases. In fact, collective
punishment, executions, and forced population movements are but a
few examples of past tactics, employed even in the most revered yet academically abused campaign—Malaya. Much of this scholarship and pop
history was benignly intended to reverse the prior over-reliance on military force. Since then, the pendulum has swung from one extreme to the
other and it will continue to do so lest greater historical rigor is applied.4
There are also key contextual differences to grapple with. Past
counterinsurgency operations took place as “internal” challenges within
empires. 5 Today, the West engages these challenges as part of a coalition and in support of weak yet legally sovereign and fully independent
states. Despite some room for divergence, contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine still presumes a sufficient harmony of interests between
intervening and host-nation governments, or at least an ability to push
the latter toward the “correct” course of action. Actual practice provides a more sobering perspective. In Iraq, institutions either collapsed
through war or were dismantled through coalition decree, leading to
the infiltration of sectarian elements into positions of central power
and a government whose interests often ran counter to those of the
intervening coalition. In Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign
confronted a deeply dysfunctional state bureaucracy and a NATO headquarters that lacked the capacity and resources to run anything but the
security aspects of operations. In both campaigns, difficulties with hostnation governments were compounded by differences among coalition
partners regarding approach, commitment, and contributions.
A further change has already been hinted at: the availability
and competence of civilian means. The strategic intent in Iraq and
Afghanistan required substantial civilian participation, large and capable
enough to compensate for in-state weaknesses. This resource was at the
disposal of past empires in the form of colonial administrations with
local experience and understanding, and local police forces that could
maintain order.6 Today, the political and civilian components of counterinsurgency are tremendously under-developed, despite efforts like the
Stabilization Unit in the United Kingdom and the ill-fated Office of the
3     Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds?’ British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (June 2009) .
4     For an elaboration of this point, see David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in
Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 19-44.
5     John Mackinlay made this point already in 1997. See John Mackinlay, “War lords,” RUSI Journal
143, no. 2 (1998): 25. It does not follow that historical counterinsurgency campaigns are entirely
irrelevant, as David French notes, the discontinuity can also be exaggerated. See David French, The
British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 252–253.
6     See for example I.A. Rigden, The British Approach to Counter- Insurgency: Myths, Realities and
Strategic Challenges, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2008), 13; Frank
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping (London: Frank Cass, 1971).
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Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the
United States. This deficiency has caused a distinct mismatch between
ambitions and resources.
Attempting to transplant past counterinsurgency approaches onto
contemporary state-building efforts also risks neglecting the essentially
conservative nature of counterinsurgency. The concept of counterinsurgency presumes that the problem at hand is an insurgency that challenges
the status quo. While successful counterinsurgency campaigns have
often involved certain political concessions, counterinsurgency operations are predicated on the survival of the state or preemption of violent
change through peaceful liberalization. However, this description hardly
fits the role played by the Kabul regime. Nor is it clear that the defeat
of the Taliban and other groups would really meet Western strategic
aims or even lead to stability. The question is whether “the insurgency”
was the issue? Or, was it a symptom of more profound problems in the
establishment of the Afghan state, its evolution, and the shortcomings
of Western intervention in the regional context in which all this has
played out?
Given the fact that external coalitions toppled the existing
regimes and instigated revolutionary societal changes in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, it is a stretch to argue we were merely protecting or even
reforming the status quo. Instead, the international community was the
true revolutionary agent of change, and branding its efforts as counterinsurgency led us to misunderstand the actual roles of different actors
within those respective societies, not least our own. Most critically, it
reveals an all-too militaristic and optimistic view of what it takes to
transform societies.7

The Way Ahead

Whether or not counterinsurgency ever provided an appropriate
lens through which to understand the security challenges presented by
failing states, it has proved too costly—politically, financially, and in
blood. Reaction to this realization has, to date, been far from impressive.
Much of it has been dominated by slogans—“no more Iraqs,” “no more
Afghanistans,” “counterinsurgency is dead”—none of which is particularly helpful so long as global interests are the rule. For sure, no one
wants to repeat such campaigns, but neither the Iraq war nor the Afghan
war began as counterinsurgencies. Instead, it was precisely our refusal
to anticipate and prepare for the complexity of war and the enemy’s
ability to adapt that produced these problems. Nothing here condemns
us to endless encores of similar campaigns, but neither can we return
to the military thinking that dominated before them: a vision of war
as an apolitical, militarily decisive, and technologically driven phenomenon, unfolding on an isolated battlefield. To do better in the future, we
must think more creatively about how to engage with war’s complexity
and political essence, in order to shape global security affairs yet without
repeating the traumas of the last decade. Recent history suggests three
options for future interventions: the Libya model, the indirect approach,
and contingency operations in support of regional and international
7     For a longer version of this argument, see Robert Egnell, “A Western Insurgency in
Afghanistan,” Joint Forces Quarterly 70, no. 3 (2013): 8-14.
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organizations. These three models in turn point to obvious areas of
investment, both intellectually and in terms of resources; yet, while
helpful, all are also reliant on key conditions and capabilities. Most critically, each requires far greater clarity about the nature and demands of
expeditionary operations, their typical duration, and the challenges of
operating as one member of a larger team.

The Libya Model

Following weeks of civil war in Libya in 2011, NATO’s North Atlantic
Council decided that some sort of military intervention was needed.
On 19 March, NATO commenced its Operation Unified Protector by
launching Tomahawk missiles and air sorties at government targets.
The aims of the operation, set by the UN Security Council, included
the establishment of a no-fly zone, the protection of civilians, and the
enforcement of an arms embargo. The unofficial aim, it was speculated, was regime change in favor of the National Transitional Council
(NTC)—the Libyan resistance movement established during the war.
Operating in coordination with NTC but without ever deploying
regular ground forces, NATO and coalition partners assisted in the
gradual defeat of the Libyan government. Most of the support came
from the air, with aircraft targeting vital government forces and installations. The war raged until 20 October 2011, when, during the battle of
Sirte, NTC forces located Qaddafi and beat him to death. Despite NTC
requests that NATO stay until the end of the year, the operation was
formally terminated the following week. In the campaign’s aftermath,
NTC set up a new government, paved the way for elections, and sought
to establish and maintain a level of relative security.
Western intervention in Libya in 2011 has been portrayed as a useful
contrast to the costly and drawn-out campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Airpower expert Christina Goulter argued:
[A]fter nearly a decade of counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, . . . OUP proved that an air campaign, focused and driven by
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], can win a war when combined effectively with irregular ground forces.8

Yet, in a sense, the Libya campaign simply repeated the so-called Afghan
Model, applied during the initial combat phase of Operation Enduring
Freedom and lauded then, too, as a uniquely effective means of applying
Western military might.9 Then as now, the model saw Western powers ply
their advanced combat capabilities—precision-guided munitions in particular—in support of local ground forces, reinforced by a small number
of special operations forces to ensure proper coordination. Going back
further, the prototype for the approach was tested in the Balkan campaigns of the 1990s, in which NATO aircraft bombed targets from a
risk-free altitude and let local allies (the Croat forces in Bosnia and the
Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo) conduct ground operations.

8     Christina Goulter, “Ellamy: The UK Air Power Contribution to Operation Unified Protector.”
Draft paper in RAND study on Operation Unified Protector, Santa Monica, Calif (Forthcoming
2014), 139
9     See Stephen Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan
and Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005–06): 161-76.
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The Libya model presents undeniable advantages. First, the approach
kept costs to a fraction of those accrued in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second,
as in the NATO-led air campaign over Kosovo, coalition and civilian
casualties were minimal; again, NATO intervened without incurring a
single fatality. Third, although some ambiguity surrounded the actual
aims in Libya, the results of the intervention appeared—at first blush at
least—far more promising than those expected from Afghanistan following NATO’s withdrawal.
These advantages notwithstanding, it is critical to acknowledge the
preconditions that allowed the Libya model to be effective. Indeed, the
campaign was in many ways exceptional, undermining its potential as a
precedent. First, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s lack of subtlety, in combination with the backdrop of democratic revolutions in Northern Africa,
provided the campaign with unprecedented international support—a
sense of urgency to “do something.” From then on, much of the war was
fought in the desert, greatly facilitating aerial bombardment. There was
also a clear opposition to Gaddafi in the NTC and the rebel troops that
served as proxies. Moreover, the geographic location, at the very borders
of Europe, facilitated both basing and logistics. These conditions will
not always obtain.
Going further, and risking a cliché, the enemy has a vote. Even
in Libya, government forces sought to exploit NATO’s strategic and
tactical preferences. Having initially operated in large regular units
across the desert, government forces adapted following the initial air
attacks. As Brigadier Ben Barry explains, Gaddafi’s forces “dispersed
heavy weapons in populated areas and made extensive use of armed 4x4
vehicles, similar to those used by the rebels,” something that “greatly
complicated NATO’s ability to identify and attack them.”10 Clearly, such
adaptation came too late, yet future adversaries are likely to be more
wily, severely limiting the viability of winning wars from the skies.
Finally, it is worth considering the political consequences of the
limited ownership inherent in this approach. The model inevitably
empowers a local proxy. The key question, therefore, is what happens
after the aerial bombardment has stopped, when the model is put back
on the shelf, and it is time to establish a new political accommodation
that is both desirable and stable. These days, the Afghan war is hardly
remembered for the initial successes of the “Afghan Model”—indeed it
was precisely the political fall-out of the Taliban’s toppling that bedeviled subsequent efforts at stabilization. Similarly, although successful in
toppling the Gaddafi regime, the Libyan intervention unleashed destabilizing forces within Libya and regionally. In Libya, “factional, regional,
tribal and ideological divisions” have marked the three years since the
revolution: the “central government, far outgunned by powerful local
militias, holds little sway beyond its offices.”11 Regionally, fighters and
weapons have spread as far as Mali and Syria, destabilizing the already
fragile states in the region.12 The implication is not that NATO should
have used ground troops in Libya, but rather that the Libya model must
not be mistaken for more than it is: it does not render intervention easy,
10     Ben Barry, “Libya’s Lessons,” Survival 53, no. 5 (2011): 6.
11     “Little to celebrate.” The Economist, February 22, 2014.
12     UN Security Council’s Group of Experts, “Final report of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya,” S/2013/99, March 20, 2012, 24-38.
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but simply offloads the responsibility for political consolidation onto
others, with whom we must learn to work far more effectively.

The Indirect Approach

In the last eight years, the US military has experienced a revolution in its understanding of counterinsurgency. When the US Army and
Marine Corps published their counterinsurgency manual in December
2006, the term denoted, almost exclusively, the deployment of large
armed formations to provide security for the host-nation population
and assume responsibility for various military and civilian tasks.13 As
the doctrine was written while 144,000 US troops were actively involved
in an insurgency in Iraq, this focus on the “direct” approach to counterinsurgency was appropriate. Even then, the manual was criticized
for not acknowledging alternative approaches and this criticism has
become far more vocal with the perceived failure of the direct approach
in Afghanistan. The dominant argument now is that for strategic, political, and financial reasons, outcomes must be achieved “indirectly,” by
relying on the structures and capabilities of the host-nation and thereby
do more with less. A key precedent for this approach is the US advisory
mission in El Salvador in the 1980s, which is credited with the defeat
of the Farabundi Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The British
campaign in Dhofar, from 1962 to 1976, provides a second, increasingly cited, precedent, since Britain relied on the armed forces of the
host-nation government along with sub-state militias to achieve its aims
there. A more recent case is the US military’s assistance of Colombia in
its campaign against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC). This case provides the perfect foil for the direct interventions
in Iraq and Afghanistan: they overlapped in time, but whereas the direct
engagements were ruinously expensive, politically costly, and ambiguous
in their outcome, the weakening of FARC under President Alvaro Uribe
is a counterinsurgency success story.14 Similarly, the US special operations forces-led efforts to assist the Philippines government against the
Abu Sayaff Group stands out as a low-cost, low-profile yet fairly successful intervention, at least in comparative terms.15
Proponents commonly point to five key advantages. First, the
indirect approach puts local forces in the lead and thereby avoids many
of the linguistic and cultural hurdles encountered by foreign troops.
Second, by keeping the response local, the counterinsurgency campaign
remains untarnished by the stigma of foreign occupation. Third, putting
local forces in the lead also reduces the political costs for the intervening
government. Fourth, these interventions are also commonly less costly
financially—a corollary of the smaller footprint.16 Fifth, and most fundamentally, the indirect approach puts the local government in charge
13     U.S. Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24
MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 2006).
14     Thomas Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies
Institute, 2002).
15     Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The
Indirect Approach,” Military Review 86, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 2006): 2-12.
16     As Fernando Luján points out, “since the approval of Plan Colombia in 1999, the cost to
run the entire program – including all military and civilian assistance – has roughly equaled the cost
of running the Iraq or Afghanistan war for a single month during the surge.” See Major Fernando
Luján, “Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention,” Voices from the Field
(Center for a New American Security, March 2013), 8.
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for solving what is, after all, its problem: it puts the onus of the solution
on local ownership and responsibility.
The indirect approach rightly recognizes the limits on what external
powers can achieve by themselves in a foreign land, particularly one
they scarcely understand. The focus on partnerships also touches on
the essence of expeditionary counterinsurgency: the need to maintain
host-nation legitimacy, build capacity, and engage in a manner that is
sustainable. While the notion that “small is beautiful”—that indirect
deployments make more sense—is largely correct, it is dangerous to stop
the analysis at this point. Indeed, the indirect approach, like counterinsurgency or interventions of any type, comprises severe challenges that
must be fully understood.
Three caveats stand out as critical. First, recent experience indicates
that advising local security forces is an art in itself. There is a common
misconception that because the advisory approach puts the local government and its security forces in the lead, the intervening power is somehow
shielded from the complexity otherwise typical of counterinsurgency.
However, as experience shows, advisory work is, in fact, highly challenging, requiring specific skills and capacities. Two problems are historically
consistent: ensuring the professionalization of the host-nation security
force and that it uses what it learns in ways that are accountable and
in keeping with mission objectives. In El Salvador, the cap on deploying a maximum of 55 US advisors and the ban against joint operations
with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) undermined these goals.
Specifically, US advisers lacked both leverage and oversight and relied on
ESAF being willing and able to follow the guidance provided. Neither
of these conditions obtained. Although the advisory campaign was vital
for regime survival in the early phase of the war, the transition for peace
a decade later had more to do with the passing of the Cold War and other
domestic factors than the marvels of the indirect approach.17
The problems of oversight and leverage resurfaced when US troops
sought to establish security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. A consistent
finding from these theaters is that the effectiveness of advisory missions
is best guaranteed by “partnering” with local security forces: living and
operating with them, day and night, from the same base and streets. Yet
the implications of this requirement are significant: they call for specific
and extensive preparation, including language training and cultural
awareness. Notwithstanding various efforts to boost regional expertise,
it is uncertain whether Western troops are adequately prepared for this
task. Pointing to special operations forces as a solution, given their
specialized skills, is insufficient. Fewer in number and not easily mass
produced, they lack the capacity to undertake large-scale advisory missions. To be sure, successful advisory efforts are rarely light in troop
numbers: a mere 55 advisers may have deployed to El Salvador, but it
is a very small country, in close proximity to the United States where
additional training was provided and, even then, the personnel cap and
other restrictions actually undermined the proper prosecution of the
campaign. To do better, sufficient advisors are required to accompany
each unit being trained.
17     David H. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency in El Salvador: The Lessons and Limits of the Indirect
Approach,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 24, no. 4 (2013).
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Therefore, the indirect approach cannot, must not, be seen as
“counterinsurgency on the cheap.” If partnering is indeed required,
advisory missions will in all cases require sustained buy-in—institutionally to create the capabilities, and politically to allow troops to operate
from the front line over protracted periods. As seen in Afghanistan, it is
often the advisors themselves who become the target so as to sever the
critical link that partnering provides.
Another consideration for the application of the indirect approach
is the need for a partner. In Colombia, the Philippines, and most other
settings where the indirect approach is said to have worked, the advisors
operated alongside an established government and military. Colombia,
for example, has a long record of elected civilian governance and
a strong military. By contrast, it is questionable whether the indirect
approach would have worked in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003,
or in similar settings. This uncertainty clearly restricts the applicability
of this approach.
Even where the central state is extant and somewhat competent,
thorny issues of legitimacy and strategy loom large. In the quest to defeat
an insurgency, the professionalization of a country’s armed forces or
security sector is but one part of a broader puzzle. David Galula’s admonition that counterinsurgency is 80 percent political and only 20 percent
military is now a cliché, but its implications have not been grasped.18
While professional security forces are critical, they are not in themselves strategically decisive: much depends on the political objectives their
operations serve. Where this strategy is misguided or altogether absent,
security operations have little or no meaning. By analogy, it serves no
purpose sharpening the scalpel if the surgeon operating is drunk.
This point is critical, as it is typically at the political level that the hostnation partnership will fray. Partners are more willing to accept military
aid and assistance than to undergo the political or social reforms deemed
necessary for success. Governments facing an insurgency almost by definition suffer from some legitimacy deficit—hence the armed resistance.
It is not uncommon that they are more concerned with retaining power
and privilege than with undercutting dissent through effective reform.
The resultant dilemma for counterinsurgency advisers is formidable. In
Dhofar, the solution to Said bin Taimur’s refusal to reform was a military
coup carried out by his own son and with the support of the British government. Within 24 hours, various liberalizing measures were passed,
giving political meaning to the armed forces’ security operations and
producing the happy outcome for which the campaign is known.19 Yet,
for a less happy precedent, consider the advisory years in Vietnam (195065) and the US decision to remove the recalcitrant Ngo Dinh Diem, a
desperate measure that opened the door to sending more US ground
troops in 1965. In other words, nothing within the indirect approach
removes the need for suasion and compulsion—diplomatic tasks where
the West under-performs. This requirement once again limits what we
can expect to achieve from the indirect approach. Much like any other
18     David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall Mall, 1964), 89.
19     Ian F.W. Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965–1975,” in
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2008), 175–190.
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model of intervention, it must be tailored to specific circumstances and
support a sound strategy.

Contingency Operations

Another means of burden sharing is by limiting the role of Western
forces and ensuring residual tasks are carried out by international,
regional, or local partners. The role played here might entail the provision of quick-reaction forces to assist a peace operation or protect it from
a sudden crisis. Such a “contingency operation” would in principle be
similar to that played by the British military during its intervention in
Sierra Leone in 2000 or by the French-led coalition force in Operation
Artemis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003.
The benefit here is that in assisting a preexisting mission, the intervening power is allowed to focus on just one phase of the campaign, thereby
limiting its exposure and risk. Yet by the same token the effectiveness
of these interventions also relies on the ability to transfer demanding
follow-on tasks to competent actors with greater staying power.
Operation Artemis is a cautionary tale. In response to the destabilization of eastern DRC, a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational
Force (IEMF) deployed to Bunia to help strengthen security and rescue
the local UN peacekeeping mission. Per the conditions tied to its
deployment, IEMF spent three months in Bunia, during which time it
expelled militia elements and reestablished security. It then handed over
responsibility to the newly created UN “Ituri Brigade,” a 5,000-strong
unit. On these merits, the operation was a success. Yet the IEMF’s
limited mandate, temporally and geographically, meant that its effects
were transient. As a later UN report found, “The strict insistence on the
very limited area of operations—Bunia—merely pushed the problem
of violent aggression against civilians beyond the environs of the town,
where atrocities continued.”20 Moreover, despite the UN force’s expansion, it remained undermanned and ill-equipped to sustain the gains
of the intervention, greatly undermining its longer-term significance.21
The British military has enjoyed successes with “contingency operations,” illustrating the value of these types of interventions but also what
they typically require. Initially deployed in Sierra Leone in 2000 to evacuate Westerners from the war-torn country, General David Richards saw
an opportunity to side directly with the Freetown government against
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). British forces were involved in
a number of confrontations against the RUF and maintained a presence
off-shore to demonstrate resolve. The combat phase ended quickly but,
notably, the British force then supported, trained, and reinforced Sierra
Leone’s army and the local UN peacekeeping mission, so the country’s
newfound stability could be sustained. Even after, Britain maintained a
140-strong force in Sierra Leone to advise the army and has remained
one of the country’s greatest bilateral donors of aid.22

20     Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (Military Division), “Operation Artemis: The Lessons
of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force” (New York: UN Department for Peace Keeping
Operations, October 2004), 14.
21     Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War (Abingdon: Routledge for International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2009), 112.
22     Ibid., 120.
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Here, too, the results are far from incontestable. Nonetheless, the
point is clear: the effectiveness of military force depended on, inter alia,
coordinated and properly resourced follow-up actions. Civil–military
cooperation and the ability to raise the competence of local and international forces to enable a smooth transition were also key. In that sense,
the use of Western troops on contingency operations calls for many of
the same capabilities as those needed for the indirect approach, which
again highlights this area as requiring more urgent attention.

Conclusion

A major factor behind the relative success in Sierra Leone was the
auspicious timing of the intervention. The role of Guinea and local
defense forces, the expansion of the UN mission, and general war weariness were all critical in achieving peace.23 These factors do not devalue
the British effort in Sierra Leone but raise an important point about
knowing when to intervene. Such knowledge is a requirement for all
modes of engagement discussed here. Simply put, interagency coordination, advisory skills, or carefully honed military capabilities will never
suffice if the strategy underlying their use is unworkable or no conducive
entry points have been found (or exist) for effective intervention.
What is needed, in part, is finer strategic thinking—the art of using
what we have in ways to meet our desired goals at an acceptable cost. Yet
at a deeper level, what is necessary is also a more sincere interest—across
the relevant arms of government—in the lands, peoples, and contexts
in which military operations are to be launched. Only by understanding the environment (its politics, history, terrain, and population) will
outsiders ever discern the opportunities for more effective intervention:
the potential partnerships, the contextual enablers, and the strengths
and weaknesses of both friend and foe. In Sierra Leone, much came
down to the initiative of the in-country commander. It would be hopeful
to rely on similar improvisation in future engagements.
Another common thread is the emphasis on broader, multinational
frameworks in which Western forces play but one part. At best, such
cooperation brings legitimacy, shared capabilities, and greater capacity.
Yet fighting with allies is not easy. Separate “partners” enter the fray
with greatly varying levels of commitment and for disparate (sometimes
entirely wrong-headed) reasons. This is a challenge for even the strongest of contributors. Indeed, it is necessary to ask, before we consider
any of the options outlined above, why it is that we intervene in the
first place and how convincingly such efforts are tied to our national
interest. Limited investment in the relevant instruments and the lack of
clear thinking going into these endeavors certainly suggest a low overall
priority. So, in our search for viable models of intervention, we must
ensure that we select our approach on the basis of strategic soundness,
not because it presents the dubious promise of an “easy war.” These interventions are never easy, and will only be made much harder if we mistake
them as such.

23     David Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: James Currey/Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 267-73.
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